
















Quantum mechanics is a huge a territory including non-relativistic quantum mechanics, relativistic quantum field theory, condensed matter theory, and quantum gravity. Each of these domains has multiple unique implications for mereology. Within each of these domains there are several different formalisms, each with its own potential implications for mereology.  In addition, different interpretations of quantum mechanics provide different mereological ontologies:

Quantum entanglement and superposition raise further questions concerning physical composition. If the quantum state completely describes a system but never collapses then it seems likely that the only system with definite physical properties is the entire universe—a dramatic failure of the properties of the whole to be determined by those of its parts! Moreover the radical indistinguishability of quantum ‘‘particles’’ often associated with the (anti)- symmetrization of the quantum state of a set of (fermions) bosons of the same species threatens to undermine their claim to exist as individual parts of the fusion of that set into a whole (Healey and Uffink, 2013, 20).
Therefore this entry will largely (but not exclusively) be restricted to non-relativistic quantum mechanics and will focus on superposition and entanglement sans larger interpretative schemas.  

Quantum Superposition and Entanglement
It is well known that in classical physics compound systems are generally characterized as consisting of separable, distinct parts that interact by means of forces encoded in the Hamiltonian function of the overall system. And that if the full Hamiltonian is known, maximal knowledge of the values of the physical quantities pertaining to each one of these parts yields an exhaustive knowledge of the whole compound system in principle. Classical systems appear to obey the following compositionality principle:

Compositionality Principle: The states of any spatio-temporally separated subsystems S1, S2, ..., SN of a compound system S are individually well defined and the states of the compound system are wholly and completely determined by them and their physical interactions including their spatio-temporal relations (cf. Howard, 1885, 989, 1992; Healey, 1991).

Many people have argued that quantum entanglement (and other features of quantum mechanics that cannot be dealt with here) entails, in one way or another, a failure of the compositionality principle. Therefore we will be concerned with the following questions: 1) Does quantum entanglement imply that wholes such as entangled states have properties that are not determined by the properties (whether intrinsic or relational) of the particles that enter into such states? 2) What is the best ontological characterization of the relationship between parts and wholes in entangled states? 3) In what sense if any does quantum mechanics tell against part/whole reductionism? And in what sense if any does quantum phenomena suggest some kind of mereological emergence? More specifically, does quantum entanglement tell against any of the following principles:

Separability principle: any two systems A and B, regardless of the history of their interactions, separated by a non-null spatio-temporal interval have their own independent real states such that the joint state is completely determined by the independent states.

Locality principle: any two spacelike separated systems A and B are such that the separate real state of A let us say, cannot be influenced by events in the neighborhood of B.

Realization principle: the properties or causal powers of wholes are synchronically determined at a time t by the properties of its proper or contemporaneously existing parts (Silberstein 2012). This is an acausal determination relation that is coextensional with mereological supervenience (Ibid).

Dynamical closure of the physical domain principle: every physical event is dynamically determined (whether uniquely or stochastically) by a) the laws governing it such as the Schrodinger equation plus b) the values of the relevant properties of the antecedent state of the system.  


Western Metaphysicians have often opted for atomistic or Lego-like conceptions of reality. Let us look at two such philosophical statements of classic modern atomism:  

Humean supervenience is named in honor of the greater [sic] denier of necessary connections. It is the doctrine that all there is to the world is a vast mosaic of local matters of fact, just one little thing and then another…. We have geometry: a system of external relations of spatio-temporal distance between points. Maybe points of spacetime itself, maybe point-sized bits of matter or aether fields, maybe both. And at those points we have local qualities: perfectly natural intrinsic properties which need nothing bigger than a point at which to be instantiated. For short: we have an arrangement of qualities. And that is all. All else supervenes on that (Lewis 1986, p x).


Humean supervenience says that the complete physical state of the world is determined by (e.g., supervenes on) the intrinsic physical state of each spacetime point or each point-like entity such as classical particles and the spatiotemporal relations between those points. Thus all fundamental properties are local properties (in the supervenience or mereological sense) and spatiotemporal relations are the only fundamental external physical relations. Humean supervenience is thus an affirmation of the separability principle given above. Whether or not it’s local in the (dynamical) locality principle sense is trickier because it’s unclear whether it rules out instantaneous action at a distance (e.g. classical Newtonian gravity).

Mereological supervenience: systems with an identical total microstructural property have all other properties in common. Equivalently, all properties of a physical system supervene on, or are determined by, its total microstructural property (Kim 1993, p. 7). 


The idea behind mereological supervenience is that the intrinsic properties of the basic parts and/or their relations determine (e.g., realize) the properties of wholes. Kim’s principle also adds a modal claim involving microphysically identical systems.

Most do not doubt that quantum entanglement tells against Humean supervenience and mereological supervience in some essential way, as many of us have argued strenuously (Hawthorne and Silberstein 1995; Silberstein 1999 and 2012). As Butterfield puts it,
At the end of Sect. 3.1, I noted the uniformity of the rules, in classical and
quantum physics, for defining a composite system’s state-space and its quantities; viz.for state-spaces, Cartesian products and tensor products respectively. The uniformity of the rules served my purpose there: namely eulogising the power of reduction. But on the other hand, several philosophers have argued that the quantum rules harbour a very different moral: namely, that the existence of entangled states in the tensor product of two Hilbert spaces, makes for important, indeed pervasive, cases of emergence combined with a failure of supervenience (and so of reduction). What am I to make of this? I can simply agree with these authors (2011, 955).
 
On most interpretations of quantum mechanics, entanglement does violate Humean and mereological supervenience as well as the realization principle in at least the following respect: entangled states are neither formally (the non-factorizability of such states) nor empirically (experimentally confirmed distinct quantum probabilities for outcomes in EPR-correlations) a function of the properties of the particles that “make them up” (Silberstein 2002).  Likewise, most agree that quantum entanglement surely must tell against the separability principle and/or locality principle depending on one’s interpretation of quantum mechanics. As Healey notes, 
This [separability] principle could fail in one of two ways: the subsystems may simply not be assigned any states of their own, or else the states they are assigned may fail to determine the state of the system they compose. Interestingly, state assignments in quantum mechanics have been taken to violate state separability in both ways (2008). 

Einstein himself was most concerned about possible violations of one or more of the preceding principles in quantum mechanics, as the following letter to Max Born makes clear:
If one asks what, irrespective of quantum mechanics, is characteristic of the world of ideas of physics, one is first of all struck by the following: the concepts of physics relate to a real outside world, that is, ideas are established relating to things such as bodies, fields, etc., which claim 'real existence' that is independent of the perceiving subject- ideas which, on the other hand, have been brought into as secure a relationship as possible with the sense-data. It is further characteristic of these physical objects that they are thought of as arranged in a space-time continuum. An essential aspect of this arrangement of things in physics is that they lay claim, at a certain time, to an existence independent of one another, provided these objects 'are situated in different parts of space'. Unless one makes this kind of assumption about the independence of the existence (the 'being-thus') of objects which are far apart from one another in space- which stems in the first place from everyday thinking- physical thinking in the familiar sense would not be possible. It is also hard to see any way of formulating and testing the laws of physics unless one makes a clear distinction of this kind. This principle has been carried to extremes in the field theory by localizing the elementary objects on which it is based and which exist independently of each other, as well as the elementary laws which have been postulated for it, in the infinitely small (four-dimensional) elements of space.
The following idea characterizes the relative independence of objects far apart in space (A and B): external influence on A has no direct influence on B; this is known as the 'principle of contiguity', which is used consistently in the field theory. If this axiom were to be completely abolished, the idea of the existence of (quasi-) enclosed systems, and thereby the postulation of laws which can be checked empirically in the accepted sense, would become impossible (Born 1971, pp. 170-1).

Let us take a moment to appreciate in more detail why quantum mechanics is believed to have these anti-atomistic implications. Beginning with J. S. Mill, many nineteenth-century British philosophers held intuitions that contrasted ‘resultant’ from ‘emergent’ mereological properties in the following sense: resultant properties share an additive parts/whole relationship, i.e. the property of the aggregate is simply the sum of properties of its constituents, whereas emergent properties are non-additive. What was meant by “resultant” was directly inspired by vector and scalar addition in Newtonian mechanics. (Kronz & Tiehen 2002, 331). For example, four hydrogen atoms combine to form a helium atom in the sun. The mass of the helium atom is non-additive or emergent, with respect to the masses of the hydrogen atoms, according to Newtonian mechanics. However, according to special relativity, additivity is restored, insofar as mass and energy are interchangeable (the mass deficit of the helium atom is converted to energy in the fusion of the hydrogen atoms).

Most consider the traditional distinction along the lines of additivity and non-additivity at best over-simplifying, if not outright misleading. For instance, Krontz and Tiehen (2002) state:

[I]t appears that a central claim of the British empiricists, that additivity is the
mark of resultant (i.e., non-emergent) properties, is wrong…the mark of a nonemergent
property of composite systems in quantum mechanics crucially involves
a multiplicative operation …[However] [t]he situation is different for evolution.
A non-separable evolution is a product rather than a superposition [i.e. addition]
... This may provide a way to partially vindicate the British emergentists. (333)

To illustrate this point in greater detail, Kronz & Tiehen examine quantum mechanical entanglement in the case of a triplet state or three spin-1/2 systems. “Entangled” states (a term first coined by Schroedinger in the 1920s) are a quantum mechanical phenomena arising out of combinations of addition and multiplication of state vectors in the formalism of quantum mechanics.  Contrast this with classical mechanics, wherein states are represented by points and not vectors; talk of adding or multiplying points is nonsensical. Quantum mechanics has cases in which a state description or an observable quantity cannot be “factored” into the product of simpler constituents thus violating the compositionality principle. Such states are referred to as “entangled,” as the simpler terms represent the properties of the system’s constituents. Thus if no such factoring can take place, then no information can be extracted concerning the properties of the system’s basic constituents. In such cases one can only have information concerning the properties of whole system, not of its basic parts. In contrast to classical mechanics, quantum mechanics has a non-Boolean logical structure and quantum properties have a non-commutative algebraic structure. Such entangled states exhibit stronger degrees of correlation than the rules of classical probability theory allow, as delimited by the so-called Bell Inequalities. Experimentally confirmed EPR-correlations tell us that such correlations apparently do not drop off with distance, obtaining even at space-like separation: this is the so-called phenomena of quantum non-locality.  

More formally, in the case of quantum mechanics the three state spaces of particles 1,2,3 (described respectively by the two-dimensional spinor spaces (H 1, H 2 H 3) combine to form a tensor product (versus a direct sum  in the case of classical mechanics) eight-dimensional composite space: H 1 H 2 H 3.   Similarly, the system Hamiltonian  combines via the rules of tensor product and superposition.  Now, in principle,  can evolve in time to become fully entangled, that is to say, the (8-dimensional) matrix representing  cannot be factored into the (8-dimensional) representations of the Hamiltonian matrices representing particles 1, 2, 3 respectively (represented accordingly by  ). In other words, in such a case, no such factorization exists, which would allow one to state that .  Instead, let us denote the fully entangled triplet (pure state) case with the Hamiltonian: .  Other possibilities include  evolving into a superposition of partially entangled  mixed doublet states, with respect to, say, systems 1 & 2: .   Finally, the system Hamiltonian can evolve into a superposition of (fully non-entangled) Hamiltonians: .   
 
Again, the preceding facts about entangled particles obtain even at space-like separation! It seems that even though each particle in our entangled system presumably occupies a region disjoint from the other, it is not the case that each has its own intrinsic spin state. Nor is it the case that the spin-state of the composite system is determined by the states of the particles taken individually, together with the spatiotemporal relations between them. No “pure” state for a single particle yields the same predictions as the “Singlet State.” Were one to ascribe a pure state to each of the electrons, their joint state would be a product state rather than an entangled state. The joint state of the pair cannot be analyzed into pure states for each of the components.

Accounts of Quantum Superposition and Entanglement
There is very little disagreement about anything said so far but there are several differences of opinion beyond this. Before we get to that however it is important to note that quantum entanglement does not entail either non-separability or non-locality. 
For example, retrocausal interpretations of quantum mechanics such as Price (2011) can avoid non-locality with the construction of a local hidden variable theory by utilizing forwards and backwards causal links (within their respective light-cones). Such retrocausal dynamics can explain any correlation between space-like separated events without adverting to non-local connections (Silberstein, Stuckey and Cifone, 2008). Such approaches rely on quantum contextuality to avoid other no-go theorems. Keeping it as general as possible let us say that an observable is contextual if and only if the measured value depends in some way on how the measurement is performed. If a property or observable is contextual that typically implies that it is not an intrinsic property. However in retrocausal accounts, contextual properties can be intrinsic properties, simply because the state of a system in such cases can dynamically depend on the details of measurements performed on it in the future. Whether or not retrocausal accounts can banish non-separability is less clear. Possibly you could avoid all non-separability with contextuality alone. For example, two entangled particles could be specified by their respective intrinsic properties despite the formalism of quantum mechanics, but because of the dependence of those properties on the measurements that will be performed on them in the future, the most useful way to write down their state given that you don't know what measurements will be performed on them is as an entangled state of the pair. Finally, it also seems that retrocausal accounts need not violate either Humean supervenience or mereological supervenience. The state of a quantum system right now supervenes on the properties of its proper parts right now. The fact that these properties might depend dynamically on future measurement interactions does not obviously violate either form of supervenience.

Let us now return to some key points of general disagreement about what quantum entanglement implies about the relationship between parts and wholes in such systems.
Answers to this question range from the relatively conservative to the more radical. Generally we can ask: does entanglement entail merely the non-separability of states or the more radical non-separability of systems; the latter implies that space-like separation is not sufficient for the distinctness or individuality of systems (Howard 1992). The answer depends on exactly the nature of the failure of the separability of states. Does entanglement imply the more radical claim that there are no separate (distinct) states for say space-like separated EPR-correlations or does it imply only that the joint state for such systems is not completely determined by their separate states as is the case on some modal interpretations for example. If the former, then the parts (subsystems) of the compound system considered in isolation will be assigned no definite states whatsoever, leaving skepticism as to the very existence of such contemporaneous parts especially if one has a properties bundle-type view about objects/entities. If the latter then in an entangled compound system S, each subsystem S1 [S2] can be regarded as having a state, but only specifiable with reference to the partner subsystem S2 [S1], via the total information contained in S. Therefore, each subsystem (contemporaneous part) derives its existence only from its role within the whole and cannot be characterized apart from the whole. Only the former more radical failure of state separability obviously entails systems non-separability. Perhaps one could also say that the parts have definite states relative to some but not all of their properties. So for example, the particles in a singlet state have definite positions but not definite spins. Different interpretations of quantum mechanics  will have differing implications on these and related matters, as we will see. 

More specifically, by way of concrete examples, one can find the following positions (accounts of entanglement) progressing from the more to less radical in the literature (these are meant to be illustrative not exhaustive):  

A) Entanglement as Ontological Structural Realism (OSR): Ladyman et. al (2007) and Silberstein et. al (2008) argue for a conception of entanglement as a case of OSR. OSR rejects the idea that reality is ultimately composed of things, i.e., self-subsisting entities, individuals or trans-temporal objects with intrinsic properties and “primitive thisness,” haecceity, etc. According to OSR the world has an objective modal structure that is ontologically fundamental, in the sense of not supervening on the intrinsic properties of a set of individuals. In Einstein’s terminology, given OSR, particles do not have their own “being thus.” The objective modal structure of the world and the abstract structural relations so characterized are fundamental features of reality relative to entities such as particles, atoms, etc. This is not anti-realism about objects or relata, but a denial of their fundamentality. Rather, relations are primary while the things are derivative, thus rejecting “building block” atomism or Lego-philosophy. Relata inherit their individuality and identity from the structure of relations. According to OSR, entities/objects and their properties are secondary to relational structure. As Kuhlmann puts it, “so proponents of ontic structural realism say we might as well dispense with things and assume that the world is made of structures, or nets of relations” (2013, 46).

While the standard conception of structure is either set theoretic or logical, OSR holds that graph theory provides a better formal model for the nature of reality because relations (links) are fundamental to nodes therein.  Certainly, it is difficult to think about structure without “hypostatizing” individuals or relata as the bearers of structure, but it does not follow that relata are truly ontologically fundamental. The point is not that there are no relata, but that relata are not fundamental.

Entanglement as OSR is especially radical in the sense that it denies so-called “compound systems” (including and especially entangled systems) are in any fundamental way composed of parts. Unlike the “fusion” relation characterized below, given OSR, it is not as if there ever were any pre-existing autonomous parts with independent existence and intrinsic properties whose behaviour somehow gets subsumed by properties of the whole system (higher-level properties) at some later time t.  Kuhlmann again, “instead of considering particles primary and entanglement secondary, perhaps we should think about it the other way round” (Ibid). 

However OSR-like interpretations of quantum mechanics are becoming more prevalent (Kuhlmann 2013). For example Carlo Rovelli’s relational interpretation of quantum mechanics  (1996) holds that a system’s states or the values of its physical quantities as standardly conceived only exist relative to a cut between a system and an observer or measuring instrument. As well, on Rovelli’s relational account, the appearance of determinate observations from pure quantum superpositions happens only relative to the interaction of the system and observer. Rovelli is rejecting absolutely determinate relata. Rovelli’s relational interpretation of quantum mechanics is inspired by Einstein’s theory of special relativity in two respects. First, he makes the following analogy with special relativity: relational quantum mechanics relativizes states and physical quantities to observers the way special relativity relativizes simultaneity to observers. Second, Einstein does not merely provide an interpretation of the Lorentz formalism, but he derives the formalism on the basis of some simple physical principles, namely the relativity principle and the light postulate.
 
Another closely related example is Mermin’s Ithaca interpretation  (1998) which tries to “understand quantum mechanics in terms of statistical correlations without there being any determinate correlata that the statistical correlations characterize.” .According to Mermin, physics, e.g., quantum mechanics, is about correlations and only correlations; “it’s correlations all the way down.” It is not about correlations between determinate physical records nor is it about correlations between determinate physical properties. Rather, physics is about correlations without correlata. On Mermin’s view, correlations have physical reality and that which they correlate does not. Mermin claims that the physical reality of a system consists of the (internal) correlations among its subsystems and its (external) correlations with other systems, viewed together with itself as subsystems of a larger system. Mermin also claims inspiration from special relativity. Both these interpretations reject the notion of absolute states and properties. It must be said however that both relational interpretations of quantum mechanics are themselves open to multiple interpretations, e.g., is Mermin making an ontic claim or a methodological one. 

For a detailed OSR model of fundamental physics see Silberstein et al (2008, 2013 and 2014), wherein we propose an interpretation of quantum mechanics and quantum field theory whereby the fundamental building blocks of Nature are not fundamental particles or excitations of a field interacting via fundamental forces. By contrast, in our relational ontology, the fundamental ontological constituents of Nature are not properties localized *in* space and time, but are elements *of* space, time, and sources (spacetimesources). 

Why spacetimesource matter? Because the metric is not independent of the matter-energy content of spacetime, rather the SCC leads to the self-consistency of a graphical spacetime metric and its relationally defined sources.  Thereby, properties are fundamentally relational, not intrinsic, and the worldtubes of transtemporal objects (TTOs) ultimately emerge contextually per these spacetimesource elements. These “spacetimesource” elements are modeled by gradients in the action of the transition amplitude (i.e., the fundamental computational element in the path integral approach to quantum field theory), and constitute what we mean by “relations.”  These relations must give rise to interacting TTOs with their worldtubes of  (seemingly) intrinsic properties distributed in space and identified through time in Lorentz invariant fashion. To do this, we underwrite the transition amplitude via a global “self-consistency criterion” (SCC) instead of a law for time-evolved entities. This SCC entails gauge invariance for quantum field theory and underwrites a divergence-free stress-energy tensor germane to the construct of TTOs in classical physics. The divergence-free stress-energy tensor reflects conserved quantities that, by Noether’s theorem, entail symmetries of the action. Thus, the time-evolved dynamics based on symmetries of the action of classical physics is ultimately underwritten relationally by an adynamical SCC of a theory fundamental to quantum field theory. Essentially, Nature is fundamentally a spatiotemporal “micrograph” from which one may construct statistically a much coarser spatiotemporal “macrograph”. Quantum physics then describes how a particular spatiotemporal region of the macrograph can be decomposed into various micrographs. On this view quantum entanglement is best characterized as a kind of global spacetimematter contextuality, it’s not a dynamical phenomena. Instead of explaining quantum entanglement with forwards and backwards causal/dynamical links in spacetime as retrocausal accounts do (forcing them to look for new dynamical laws to account for this), we employee acausal and adynamical global constraints (the SCC) that reside in a theory fundamental to the quantum. Thus on our view quantum entanglement violates neither locality nor separability.
B) Entanglement as “Fusion”:  Humphreys (1997) characterizes a type of property emergence he calls “fusion” and claims that quantum entanglement is a paradigmatic example. In order to explain the dynamics of fusion, Humphreys makes use of the notion of levels:
(L) There is a hierarchy of levels of properties L0, L1, …, Ln, … of which at least one distinct level is associated with the subject matter of each special science, and Lj cannot be reduced to Li, for any i < j. 
Note that events are property instantiations at a time for Humphreys and that so understood are the relata of causation. He  formally represents events as follows: Pmi(x ri) denotes an i-level entity (i.e., xr) instantiating an i-level property (i.e., Pm), for i > 0. Properties and entities are indexed to the first level at which they are instanced. Now let “*” denote the fusion operator. If Pmi(x ri)(t1) and Pni(x si)(t1) are i-level events (i.e., the event of x r's exemplifying Pm at t1, etc.), then the fusion of these two events, [Pmi(x ri)(t1)*P ni(xs i)(t1)], produces an i+1-level event, [Pmi*P ni][(xri)+(x si)](t2), which can also be denoted as Pli+1[(xri)+(x si)](t2). The fusion operation is  a diachronic, dynamical one.  
For our purposes the essential feature of a fused event [Pmi*P ni][(xri) + (xsi)](t2) is that it represents a non-separable whole in that its causal effects cannot be truly characterized in terms of the separate causal effects of its basic parts. More specifically, within the fusion the original property instances Pmi(x ri)(t1) and Pni(x si)(t1) no longer exist as separate contemporaneous entities and they no longer have all their i-level causal capacities available for use at the i+1-level.  Hence Humphreys’ account of entanglement as fusion represents a radical kind of non-separability but not as radical as OSR for the reasons given above.
C) Entanglement as Nonseparability of the Hamiltonian: Kronz and Tiehen (2002) argue that entanglement as OSR or fusion are unnecessarily radical and opt instead for the less radical conception discussed above wherein entangled systems have contemporaneous parts but the parts cannot be characterized or specified independently of their role in the whole. More formally, the time evolution of the density operator that is associated with a part (subsystem) of a composite entangled system cannot be characterized in a way that is independent of the time evolution of the whole (345-46).  

All three of the preceding accounts, to one degree or another, tell against Humean supervenience, mereological supervenience, or the realization principle. None of the preceding accounts tells against the dynamical closure principle. From the preceding discussion it is obvious that there are several different ways to conceive of and explain quantum entanglement and quantum phenomena more generally. Obviously, such interpretive choices will have a major impact on questions of mereology.   

Another question is whether entanglement is best explained and characterized synchronically in terms of the failure of the compositionality principle—the nonseparability of quantum states at a time t (as superficially suggested by Humphreys’ fusion relation which upon closer examination is a diachronic one) or, diachronically and dynamically in terms of the linear evolution of the Schrodinger equation (Huttemann 2005).  The question here is whether it is the Schrodinger dynamics that best explains quantum entanglement or rather something inherently synchronic about quantum mereology. One may ultimately find this distinction suspect however, for example, it is widely regarded that the essential properties of entangled states (their non-separability) are a function of the linearity of the dynamical Schrodinger equation. Or take the case of entanglement characterized as the non-separability of the Hamiltonian. The Hamiltonian or the evolution operator is non-separable if it can be written only as a superposition of tensor products of the Hamiltonians or evolution operators for the parts (subsystems). Unlike a non-separable Hamiltonian, a separable one gives time evolutions of the parts of the compound system that are independent of each other. If Kronz and Tiehen gave us some reason to believe that the non-separability of quantum states at a time t was a function of the non-separability of the Hamiltonian then the distinction between the synchronic and diachronic characterizations would be little more than pragmatic.   

While it is almost certainly true on most accounts of quantum entanglement that the compositionality principle will fail and therefore mereological reduction will fail for such systems, this does not settle the question of reduction entirely. Huttemann (2005) notes that while quantum entanglement clearly tells against synchronic microexplanation if only because of non-factorizability (the clearly determinate state of the compound cannot be explained by determinate states of the parts in the case of superposition or entanglement because no attribution of pure states to (some of) the parts is possible in such cases), it does not obviously tell against dynamical microexplanation. The former explains the state of a compound system at t in terms of the states of the constituents at t. The latter explains the state of a compound system at t in terms of earlier state of the compound system plus the dynamics of the system. The latter is generally based on the following: laws for the dynamics of the parts considered in isolation, laws of composition and when necessary laws of interaction. The key point here is that states of the parts play no necessary role in the explanation of the dynamics of compound systems. As he puts it, “Diachronic microexplanation does not require the states of the constituents to be specifiable” (119).  

Huttemann goes on to show that quantum mechanics is no worse off than classical mechanics with respect to successful diachronic microexplanation: A vector in Hilbert space represents the state of a quantum mechanical system at a time t. The Schrodinger equation describes its dynamics, i.e., its time evolution. All this requires that one determine the quantum mechanical Hamiltonian. In the case of an isolated one-particle system, the classical Hamiltonian has to be replaced by the quantum mechanical Hamiltonian H p P2/2m, where P is the momentum operator of the particle. The behavior of the system of two non-interacting particles is determined by the same procedure as in the classical case. A quantum mechanical law of composition is invoked that requires that we take the tensor product of the two Hilbert spaces so as to gain a new Hilbert space in which the two-particle system can be represented. The Hamiltonian for the combined system is the sum of those for the isolated subsystems. Microexplanation in quantum mechanics is therefore very much the same as in classical mechanics. The dynamics of
compound quantum mechanical systems can be explained in terms of the
dynamics of the components considered in isolation (plus laws of composition
and interaction). The mathematical tools we use to describe the system and subsystems changes but that is it. Quantum entanglement, i.e., the failure of synchronic microexplanation, does not undermine diachronic microexplanations. In quantum mechanics the same sort of “completely general” microreductive strategies are available and employed as in classical mechanics; Hamiltonians are built according to the same procedure as in classical mechanics. Huttemann notes that: 

Analyzing the dynamics of a compound quantum mechanical system in terms of the parts (plus laws of composition and interaction) does not commit us to the claim that while the parts constitute the compound, they are still identifiable as parts. What we are committed to is this: First, there is some sense in which we legitimately talk about the parts of a compound system as systems of their own. For instance, the parts are systems of their own in the following sense: they were identifiable before they constituted the compound. Second, we are committed to give some kind of interpretation of the terms in the Hamiltonian. For instance, the kinetic energy terms refer to how the constituents would have developed if they were isolated. Such a counterfactual claim does not commit us to any claims about what the parts actually do while they are constituting the compound.  The upshot is that the quantum mechanical explanation of the dynamics of compound quantum systems is just as reductionist as its classical counterpart (123).
 





Quantum Entanglement in a Relativistic Setting
Which of the preceding accounts of quantum entanglement the scientific and philosophical community accepts will depend ultimately upon considerations that transcends non-relativistic quantum mechanics, such as considerations from relativistic quantum field theory and quantum gravity.  Take quantum field theory. As Maudlin notes in his excellent 1998 (56-57) article mereological matters are far worse in relativistic settings. A whole is presumably made up of parts that exist together at the same time. Indeed, that is what is meant by a whole: each and every point in the region of spacetime designated as “the whole” is simultaneous with every other point. Think now of our space-like separated EPR-systems. Suppose that by the “whole,” occupied by region R, we mean: the composite made up of the spacetime regions R1, occupied by particle 1 (corresponding to some point on particle 1’s worldline) and R2, (corresponding to some point on particle 2’s worldline). Keep in mind that particle 1 and 2 are in an entangled state.  Now assume that our entangled system is embedded in Minkowski spacetime, we then lose the relation of absolute simultaneity between any two (non-identical) spacetime points. So when we try to relate the points along the worldlines of distinct particles, there is no way to specify uniquely which two are absolutely simultaneous with each other. That is, we can choose to relate different stages of each of the particle’s worldlines to each other, thus constructing many wholes, none being preferred as far as special relativity is concerned. It then follows that the “whole” in question (being a composite of R1+R2) can be divided along many, equally physically plausible, space-like hypersurfaces: some divisions have R1 preceding R2 in time, others R2 preceding R1 in time and so on.  The situation gets thorny when we start asking questions about the state of particle 1 or 2 after a measurement on one of the particles has taken place.
	
Suppose that, in the life of particle 1, it is part of the product state S (the “singlet” state), but after a measurement we discover that 1’s spin is z-up. The state is now described as |z-up, 1>|z-down, 2> (for perfectly anti-correlated particles). So, before measurement, particle 1 was non-separable with particle 2. However, after the measurement, we have a completely factorizable state.​[1]​ Now, chose a point P on the worldline of particle 2 and we get a strange result: on one hypersurface, particle 2 (at P) is part of a non-separable whole described by a non-factorizable product state S. However, given the relativity of simultaneity, it is equally true that: point P on particle 2’s worldline is also part of a completely factorizable state which tells us that 2’s state is decidedly |z-down, 2>. Now, if we have created the particles in an entangled state and they have moved out to some distance, and we know that the physical states of each particle must be regarded as part of a larger whole, then which whole is it? As Maudlin dramatizes it:
… Relativity transforms [quantum] holism from a mere surprise to a real theoretical problem, It now seems not just that a particle may not have an intrinsic state, not just that one must supplement the physical description of the parts with a further specification of the whole, but that the parts may be attributed seemingly conflicting states depending on the whole that is considered (1998, 60). 

 
It is well known that in quantum field theory the location of a particle depends on one’s frame of reference. Indeed, that the particle has a location at all is frame dependent. Weirder still, the number of particles is relative to reference frame. Philosophers of physics are fond of cooking up interpretations of non-relativistic quantum mechanics, but at the end of the day any interpretation of physical reality must be consistent with and driven by such wider considerations.    
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^1	  A caveat about the Everett interpretation. The state remains non-factorizable after measurement in Everett, but the state in each branch is (FAPP) factorizable.
